## Message Text

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ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 NEA-14 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 RSC-01

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SAM-01 DRC-01 /120 W

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R 140610Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8253

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY SANAA

USMTM DHAHRAN

SECRETJIDDA 4709

E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MARR, SA, US

SUBJ: AGENDA FOR SAUDI-US SECURITY DISCUSSION

REF: (A) JIDDA 4569; (B) STATE 166126

- 1. OUR COMMENTS ON THE AGENDA FOR THE VISIT OF DOD ASST SECRETARY ELLSWORTH TO SAUDI ARABIA PRESUPPOSE DEPARTMENT AND DOD SUPPORT OUR RECOMMENDATION (REF A) THAT THE PROPOSED VISIT BE BROKEN INTO TWO SEGMENTS.
- 2. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT MR. ELLSWORTH CONCENTRATE HIS CONSULTATIONS ON REGIONAL SECURITY MATTERS AS OUTLINED IN PARA 6.A(1)-(5). THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO THE PARAGRAPHS IN REF B:
- 3. 6.A.(1) GENERAL REVIEW. THE SAUDIS WILL BE INTERESTED IN OUR VIEW OF REGIONAL SECURITY. WE CONCUR IN THE SUGGESTED APPROACH THROUGH THINK IT MIGHT EVEN BE BROADENED SECRET

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TO TOUCH ON EUROPE AND MEDITERRANEAN REGION. WE SOO NO

UTILITY IN BROACHING INDIAN OCEAN AS A DISCRETE SUBJECT. SAUDIS WOULD BE PLEASED BY OUR ASSUMPTION THAT THEY HAD A ROLE IN A STRATEGICALLY LARGER WORLD. WE THINK IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT IN ADDITION TO GIVING OUR ASSESSMENT WE REQUEST (AND LISTEN TO) THEIRS.

6.A.(2). RELATIONS WITH IRAN. WE SHOULD SEEK SAUDI VIEWS ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE ROLE WHICH THEY FORESEE FOR IRAN IN THE SECURITY OF THE GULF. HOWEVER, TO ASK THEM HOW THEY PLAN TO COORDINATE MORE EFFECITVELY WITH IRAN MIGHT BE TO ASSUME SOMETHING WHICH IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN. WE ARE NOT SURE THAT THE SAUDIS ARE CONVINCED OF THE WISDOM OR NECESSITY OF FORMAL COOPERATION WITH IRAN. WE KNOWN THEY DO NOT ACCEPT A LEGITIMATE IRANIAN ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF (ACQUIESCENCE IN THE OMAN SITUATION NOTWITHSTANDING). AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT ON ARMS REQUESTS (AS REGARDS QUALITY) WILL INCREASE SAUDI RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH SAG SEEMS DOOMED TO REMAIN SECOND BEST BY COMPARISON.

6.A.(3). OMAN. WE MAY DISCUSS (BUT NOT URGE) A CLOSER POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAISAL AND SULTAN QABUS. HOWEVER WE DON'T SEE HOW THIS IS NECESSARILY LINKED TO THE EXPANSION OF JORDAN'S ROLE IN OMAN VIA SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT. WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO RAISING THIS LATTER TOPIC ALSO THROUGH WE REPEAT THE CAUTIONARY NOTE THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE BECOME SENSITIVE TO OUR TELLING THEM HOW THEY CAN BEST PAY FOR OTHER COUNTRIES' SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

6.A(4). YAR. WE ENDORSE A THROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE YAR. WE SHOULD IN THIS CONNECTION CLEARLY INFORM THE SAUDIS WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO TO ASSIST THE YAR AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO OUR ABILITY TO ASSIST. WE SHOULD AVOID TELLING THE SAUDIS ONCE AGAIN WHAT WE THINK THEY OUGHT TO DO. THEY KNOWN OUR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. A JOINT SAUDI-US WORKING GROUP ON ASSISTANCE TO THE YEMEN MIGHT HAVE MERIT, THOUGH (SHADES OF THE QABBANI PLAN), WE BELIEVE THAT THE IDEA SECRET

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SHOULD BE APPROACHED CAUTIOUSLY. IN PAST, MOREOVER, MANY OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SULTAN ABOUT AID TO YEMEN HAVE BEEN UNSATISFACTORY. SULTAN HAS THE HABIT OF FORCE-FULLY SUGGESTING US--FOR OPENERS--PROVIDE YAR WITH EXTENSIVE GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THE SAUDIS THROUGH MISUNDERSTANDING BECOMING AS DISAPPOINTED IN OUR PERFORMANCE VIS-A-VIS THE YAR AS WE HAVE BECOME IN THEIRS.

6.A.(5). HORN OF AFRICA. A DISCUSSIO OF HORN OF AFRICA SECURITY QUESTIONS WOULD BE USEFUL. THE SAUDIS HAVE EX-PRESSED AN INTEREST IN HELPING THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME. WE SHOULD OUTLINE OUR PRESENT ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION THERE AND GIVE OUR ESTIMATE OF THE PROSPECTS FOR LONG TERM STABILITY. WE MIGHT ALSO SUGGEST WAYS IN WHICH THE SAG CAN ASSIST THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME. HOWEVER, UNLESS WE CAN HONESTLY ASSURE THE SAUDIS THAT THEIR MONEY WILL BE GOING TO A MODERATE REGIME WITH GOOD LONG TERM SURVIVAL PROSPECTS WE MIGHT BE BETTER OFF NOT WAST-ING OUR POLITICAL CAPITAL IN THIS DIRECTION. WE DIFIN-ITELY SHOULD BRIEF THE SAUDIS ON SOVIET ACTIVITY IN SOMALIA AND ASSESS FOR THEM THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOMALI-USSR FRIENDSHIP TREATY. WE SHOULD ASK SAUDIS WHAT MIG T BE DONE (PERHAPS IN ARAB LEAGUE CONTEXT) TO REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE.

4. CONCERNING PARAS 6B,C, AND D REF B, FEEL WE MUST INSERT CAUTIONARY NOTE CONCERNING SAUDI RECEPTIVENESS AT THIS POINT TOWARD GENERAL PROGRAM REVIEWS. THOSE SAUDIS WHO HAVE RISEN TO PROGRAM MANAGEMENT POSITIONS ARE ACTION ORIENTED; THEY ARE INTERESTED IN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS (PRIMARILY LONG LEAD TIMES AND MOUNTING COSTS ON ORDERS FOR EVERYTHING) AND SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS (REDUCING THESE LEAD TIMES AND HOLDING COSTS DOWN). THEIR INTEREST IN GENERAL REVIEW OF PROGRAMS HAS REACHED A LOW EBB.

5. DURING 4-6 WEEKS AFTER PRESENTATION OF DOD SURVEY USMTM WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE PROBLEM AREAS SAUDIS WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS. WE WILL PASS USMTM'S FINDINGS ON TO WASHINGTON IN TIME TO ALLOW SPECIALIST GROUP TO PREPARE TO RESPOND TO SPECIFIC SAUDI CONCERNS. SECRET

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6. WE BELIEVE MANPOWER SHOULD BE HANDLED IN SAME WAY, AND WILL URGE SAUDIS TO PINPOINT FOR USMTM AREAS IN WHICH THEY ARE READY TO IMPLEMENT DOD SURVEY RECOMMENDATIONS. SUCH STEPS WOULD BE SUITABLE TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION. AN ATTEMPT TO REMIND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE THAT CIVILIAN SECTOR ALSO NEEDS SCARCE MANPOWER WILL NOT MAKE MUCH IMPRESSION. FROM MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON DOWN, EVERY PROGRAM MANAGER IS ATTEMPTING TO RECUIT PEOPLE NEEDED TO MAKE HIS RESPECTIVE PROGRAM WORK. THANKS TO DOD SURVEY, MODA IS AHEAD OF CIVILIAN SECTOR IN AWARENESS OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PROBLEM. BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRIORITIES WILL ARISE ONLY WHEN CIVILIAN SECTOR'S NEEDS ARE AS CLEARLY FORMULATED AND EFFECTIVELY EXPRESSED AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AS ARE MODA'S. IN INTER-

VAL, MINDEF WILL NOT MODERATE ITS OWN ATTEMPTS TO RE-
CURIT AND TRAIN MANPOWER, REGARDLESS OF CIVILIAN NEEDS.
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## Message Attributes

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